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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfections on investment, 
capital-labour substitution, labour productivity and job reallocation in a cross-country 
framework. In the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006), 
we exploit variation in the need for reallocation at the sectoral and aggregate level to assess 
the average effect of EPL on firms’ policies. Then, exploiting firm-level information we study 
if the effect of EPL is stronger in firms with lower levels of internal resources. We find that, on 
average, EPL reduces investment per worker, capital per worker and value added per 
worker in high reallocation sectors relative to low reallocation sectors. The reduction in the 
capital-labour ratio is less pronounced in firms with higher internal resources, suggesting 
that financial constraints exacerbate the negative effects of EPL on capital deepening. 
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1 Introduction 
A large literature has established the importance of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
in affecting job flows by reducing both workers’ hiring and firing. Given that EPL represents 
an obstacle to the reallocation of resources, it is plausible that it also has a bearing on firms’ 
investment decisions, on the capital-labour ratio and, eventually, on productivity.1 However, 
if EPL affects the pattern of investment and capital accumulation, a natural question – left so 
far unaddressed by the literature – concerns the impact of financial market imperfections 
on firms’ response to more stringent employment protection provisions. The ability to adjust 
the capital stock or to adopt new technologies in the face of stricter EPL is in fact likely to be 
different in firms that have access to credit rather than financially constrained firms. Financially 
constrained firms may, for example, be unable to channel all their internal resources 
to productive investments when an increase in EPL raises labour costs and workers’ 
bargaining power. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical analysis of the effects of 
financing constraints on the adjustment of capital and labour in response to a change in EPL. 
We analyze the joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfections on investment, 
capital-labour substitution, labour productivity and job reallocation in a cross-country 
framework. In the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006), 
we exploit variation in the need for reallocation at the sectoral and aggregate level to assess 
the average effect of EPL on firms’ policies. Then, exploiting firm-level information on the 
availability of firms’ internal resources we build different variables measuring firms’ liquidity 
(operating cash-flow and net liquid assets) and study if the effect of EPL is stronger in firms 
with lower levels of internal resources that are therefore more likely to be financially 
constrained. 
While there is a growing consensus in the empirical literature around the idea that 
employment protection regulations have important effects on employment adjustment, 
relatively little is known about the effects of employment protection on investment, capital 
deepening and labour productivity. Only recently these issues have received attention. 
Bassanini et al. (2009) look at the effect of EPL on job reallocation and TFP, using 
industry-level data (EUKLEMS) and find a negative effect of EPL on TFP. Autor et al. (2007) 
study the US case and, exploiting microdata, find that after an increase in EPL capital 
deepening increases and TFP declines. 
This paper focuses on the role of financial market imperfections in shaping 
the response of firms to EPL. In our case, the use of firm-level data is crucial not only to 
control for firm-level heterogeneity but also – and most importantly – to achieve identification 
of the effect of interest, namely the interaction between firm availability of internal finance 
(financial market imperfections) and aggregate EPL (labor market frictions). To this aim, 
we exploit the availability of firm-level information from Amadeus data which is, to the best 
of our knowledge, the only available source of comparable firm-level information on balance 
sheets for countries for which we also have information on the nationwide level of EPL. 
                                                                          
1. See Autor et al. (2007), Bassanini et al. (2009)  and Cingano et al. (2008), discussed in the next section. 
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One reason for the lack of studies on the effects of EPL on investment and capital 
deepening is that, while theoretical models offer clear predictions regarding the effects 
of adjustment costs on job turnover, they provide no guidance on the expected effects of 
employment protection laws on capital investment, the capital-labour ratio and productivity. 
Moreover, both the theoretical and empirical literature are virtually silent on the interaction 
between financial markets and EPL, as discussed in the literature section. 
In general the presence of dismissal costs will raise firms’ adjustments costs. 
For this reason firms may have incentives to distort their production choices toward the 
more flexible input, thus substituting labour for capital. On the other hand, EPL may 
strengthen workers’ bargaining power and exacerbate the “hold up” problem typical of 
investment decisions, resulting in less investment per worker. Hence, for a given technology, 
stringent firing costs might result in less capital per worker. However, when firms can adapt 
their technologies, higher EPL should favour the adoption of more capital-intensive 
technologies in the longer run. The final result on investment (and therefore the capital-labour 
ratio in the long run) is ambiguous and may therefore depend on workers’ bargaining power 
and on the time span of the data. 
EPL will also typically have an ambiguous effect on labour productivity: if dismissal 
protections induce firms to retain (some) unproductive workers, this will cause a decline in 
labour productivity, ceteris paribus. Offsetting this factor, employment protection not 
only protects workers, it also induces human capital accumulation and thus improves 
productivity [Belot et al. (2007)]. Furthermore firms may screen new hires more stringently 
when firing costs are high, leading to a favourable compositional shift in the productivity of 
the employed workforce. 
The first part of this paper assesses the average effect of EPL on investment, 
the capital-labour ratio and labour productivity using Amadeus data. Following Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), our estimates exploit both variation in the regulation across countries and the 
different relevance of the constraints imposed by regulation on firms in different sectors. We 
estimate the role of EPL looking at whether its impact is greater in industries where, in the 
absence of regulations, job reallocation would be higher. Exploiting the possibility to calculate 
job flows in different countries and industries from firm-level data, the “intrinsic” degree of 
volatility at the industry level is measured computing industry job reallocation in a hypothetical 
frictionless country with no employment regulation that faces world-average reallocation 
shocks [Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006)]. 
The analysis on firms’ choices of capital and labour inputs shows that, on average, 
EPL reduces investment per worker, capital per worker and measured labour productivity 
(value added per worker) in high reallocation sectors relative to low reallocation sectors. The 
estimated effects are non-negligible. Reducing employment protection from the level 
prevailing in Greece in 1997 to that observed in Ireland in the same year (this shift correspond 
to the 90th to the 10th percentile of the country-by-year EPL distribution in our sample) 
increases capital intensity in industries at the 10th relative to industries at the 90th percentile 
of the reallocation distribution by 12%. The same exercise would imply an increase in 
investment per worker and in value added per worker in high relative to low turnover 
industries by 6.8% and 8.6%, respectively. As most previous literature, we also find that EPL 
raises adjustment costs, as we find that EPL reduces job flows proportionately more in 
industries that require a higher level of reallocation. 
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Once the average effects of EPL are established, we put to test the main hypothesis 
of the paper, namely that financial market imperfections affect firms’ responses to shocks in 
countries and sectors that are differently affected by EPL. We build two different firm-level 
measures of financial liquidity, one based on flows (cash-flow) and one based on stocks 
(net liquid assets). As the financial variables that measure liquidity vary at the firm level, we are 
able to control for any time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics that may affect our 
dependent variables and are correlated with the level of firms’ internal resources by using 
firms fixed effects, thus fully exploiting the firm-level dimension of the dataset. 
We first show that the mere presence of an interaction term between EPL and 
firm-level measures of liquidity in the estimating equation does not alter the previous result 
that EPL has a negative significant impact on our dependent variables in high reallocation 
sectors relative to low reallocation sectors. However, if we do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we also find that the negative effect of EPL on the capital-labour ratio is larger 
the higher the level of internal resources of the firm. This counterintuitive effect is likely driven 
by composition effects at the industry level, as firms producing larger cash-flow not only have 
higher collateral and easier access to credit, but are also different along other dimensions, 
such as growth prospects and exporting propensity. In fact, when we move to a specification 
that includes firms fixed effects to control for firms’ time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
and identify the effects of EPL from contrasts of within-firm changes, we find that EPL still 
reduces the capital-labour ratio, but less so in firms with higher internal resources 
(as measured either by cash-flow or by net liquid assets). This result seems to favour the 
interpretation that financial constraints exacerbate the negative effects of EPL on capital 
deepening. However, we take this finding as suggestive but only tentative as, when we turn 
to investments, we find only weak (if any) evidence of a differential effect of EPL on firms with 
different levels of liquid resources, a result possibly due to the lumpiness of the investment 
process, which deserves further exploration. Finally, neither value added per worker nor job 
reallocation are affected differentially by EPL in firms with different levels of internal resources. 
1.1 Policy Implications 
Our paper delivers potentially important policy implications. The debate on the role of EPL 
needs to consider not only the direct effect on employment flows, but also the indirect 
impact due to distorted investment incentives. Investment subsidies usually do not take 
into account the possible distortions induced by EPL and therefore may be excessive 
or insufficient. 
Our findings potentially bear on the observed differences in the speed of structural 
change across developed countries [Rogerson (2008)]: the distorted incentives for 
capital investment and their productivity effects may slow down the structural change 
from manufacturing industries towards services. Since most of the employment growth 
occurs in the service sector, these distortions may reduce employment growth, efficiency and 
income growth. 
Regarding the interaction with financial markets, firms with low levels of liquid assets 
may have reduced ability to adjust their capital stock; the difficult substitution of capital for 
labour might lead to a decrease in the productivity of the employed workers. The obvious 
policy implication is that EPL is more harmful for liquidity constrained firms, or for sectors and 
countries where access to external credit is more difficult, and policies to alleviate the effects 
of EPL should be targeted there (or alternatively that financial constraints should be first 
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softened for those same firms and sectors). However it is also true that EPL provides 
insurance to workers against firing. Hence, from the point of view of overall welfare, 
employment protection policies should be jointly evaluated with financial market frictions in 
the classic efficiency-equity trade-off. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and the various 
mechanisms which link EPL to investment in capital and to labour productivity yielding 
ambiguous results for both. Section 3 illustrates the research method and discusses 
the identification strategy, while Section 4 introduces the data used for the study. Section 5 
presents the basic results on the average effect of EPL while section 6 discusses the 
differential effects in financially sound vs. financially fragile firms. Section 7 provides some 
robustness checks and extends the analysis to examine the differential role of employment 
protection for temporary and permanent workers. Section 8 discusses the policy implications 
and concludes. 
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2 Theoretical Considerations and Previous Empirical Literature 
In this section we review part of a very large literature on the economic impact of EPL, 
focussing on the expected effects on (1) investment and capital-labour substitution and (2) 
labour productivity. Models of labour demand in the presence of adjustment costs 
unambiguously predict a negative impact of firing restrictions on firing and hiring decisions 
[Bertola (1990)]. The effects of EPL on job reallocation [the sum of firm’s job creation and 
(absolute levels of) job destruction] have been extensively studied in the empirical literature, 
and consequently they are not the focus of this paper. It suffices to say that there is quite a 
consensus on the negative effects of EPL on job reallocation. Among the recent empirical 
papers, Autor et al. (2006) and Kugler and Pica (2008) study the impact of EPL on 
employment reallocation at the firm level in the US and Italy, respectively. At the 
cross-country level, Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004), Micco and Pages (2004) and Haltiwanger 
et al. (2006) among others exploit cross-country differences in EPL to establish a negative 
relationship between job flows and firing restrictions. 
2.1 EPL, investment and capital-labour substitution 
As argued in the introduction, there are theoretical reasons to expect an ambiguous effect 
of EPL on the capital labour ratio. 
First, notice that firing costs are likely to push up labour costs even though labour 
may bear part of the burden via lower wages. For instance, severance payments and notice 
periods are a transfer from the firm to the worker, and it is likely that workers at least partially 
compensate firms for this transfer [Leonardi and Pica (2008)]. Also the tax component of 
firing costs does not necessarily raise labour costs one to one in countries with an experience 
rating scheme, as the receipts can be used to compensate firms via lower unemployment 
insurance premiums [as in Blanchard and Tirole (2004)]. 
While in perfect labour markets an increase in the cost of labour will imply 
substitution of labour with more capital, in models with wage bargaining between workers 
and firms there may be the opposite effect. When there is wage bargaining, workers will use 
the protection of EPL to claim higher wages [Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and Garibaldi and 
Violante (2005)]. EPL will strengthen the outside option of workers and worsen the outside 
option of firms in the wage bargain. As a result, EPL may result in a higher bargained wage. 
When EPL pushes up labour costs, because it is an actual cost or because the 
government or workers do not fully compensate firms for their transfers, firms will reduce 
their hiring until expected costs are in line with expected profits again and/or will reduce their 
investment. In models with capital investment an increase of EPL and of the bargained wage 
gives rise to a “hold up” problem. 
If workers and employers meet in a random, costly process, some investment 
decisions have to be taken after a worker (of a given skill level) has been located and hired: 
and since replacing that worker would be costly, the worker can in general try and bargain 
for higher wages if investment increases the job’s productivity. The employer is ‘held up’ 
by the worker, who lowers the employer’s private returns to investment and therefore his/her 
incentive to invest [Bertola (1994)]. 
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A different case arises in the longer run when firms are not held up by irreversible 
investments and technology adoption becomes an issue. More EPL means that labour is 
more costly and when adopting new technologies firms will choose more capital intensive 
technologies [see among others Caballero and Hammour (1998), Alesina and Zeira (2006) 
and Koeniger and Leonardi (2007)]. 
2.2 EPL and labour productivity 
The impact of EPL on labour productivity is also, in principle, ambiguous. On the one 
side, EPL hampers the reallocation of workers and jobs across industries and firms. 
Therefore, when the importance of reallocation for productivity is large, productivity 
falls. On the other side, EPL may have a positive effect on productivity via specific 
investments and learning-by-doing. Mixed results are instead found in studies that focus on 
partial EPL reform via the introduction of temporary contracts. A screening period of 
temporary contracts may lead to better matches, increasing productivity, but the incentives 
for specific investments and the period for learning-by-doing may fall, reducing productivity. 
a) Considerations suggesting a negative effect of EPL on productivity 
More stringent EPL may reduce productivity because of ‘sclerosis’ in the production 
structure (i.e. EPL is an obstacle to reallocation of activity across industries and to 
risk-taking), because higher skill losses during longer periods of unemployment, or because 
employees, shielded from a possible layoff due to firing costs, tend to shirk on the job more 
often. 
As to reallocation and risk-taking, according to Nickell and Layard (1999) ‘there 
seems to be no evidence that either stricter labour standards or employment protection 
lowers productivity growth rates’. For their empirical analysis, Nickell and Layard use 
aggregate data for 20 OECD countries observed in the period 1976-1992. In some 
specifications they actually find a positive effect of EPL on the growth rate of labour 
productivity but this effect disappears in other specifications. 
Other papers emphasize the effects of EPL on reallocation via entry and exit of firms. 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show how the distortion induced by firing restrictions 
pushes firms to use resources less efficiently. As a result, employment levels adjust at a lower 
speed and productivity is reduced. Poschke (2007) emphasises the role of firing costs in the 
selection of the most efficient firms and the exit decision of low productivity firms, if exiting 
firms cannot avoid paying them. Samaniego (2006) claims that firing restrictions are 
more costly in industries characterised by rapid technological change such as ICT. Countries 
where regulations are more stringent will therefore tend to specialise in industries with a slow 
rate of technical change. 
Some studies emphasize the obstacle of EPL to undertake risky activities. 
Bartelsman and Hinloopen (2005) find that EPL has a significant negative effect on 
investments in ICT. They run regressions using data for 13 OECD countries for the period 
1991-2000. They conclude that EPL reduces the incentive for firms to invest in innovative 
activities with high returns and a high risk of failure because firms want to avoid the risk of 
paying high firing costs. Saint-Paul (2002) argues that high firing costs may induce secondary 
innovation that improves existing products rather than introducing riskier ones. 
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Ichino and Riphahn (2005) and Riphahn (2005) claim that layoff protection (or the 
lack thereof during the probation period) might also affect productivity by reducing worker 
effort because there is less threat of layoff in response to poor work performance or 
absenteeism. 
b) Considerations suggesting a positive effect of EPL on productivity 
More stringent EPL may also promote specific investments and result in more 
learning-by-doing, which may increase productivity. EPL also provides insurance against 
uninsurable labour income risk, and this may allow for better search of jobs. 
Belot et al. (2007) propose a framework where, by providing additional job security, 
protection against dismissal may increase workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific 
human capital, therefore enhancing productivity. On the other hand, higher firing costs 
raise separation costs, increase the bargaining power of the worker, and thereby raise 
wages. Only at low levels of employment protection is an increase in EPL beneficial to 
productivity-growth, and the positive effects of employment protection are larger in sectors 
where firm-specific skills matter more. 
Wasmer (2006) suggests that by inducing substitution of specific for general skills, 
firing restrictions may have a negative effect on productivity when workers need to be 
reallocated across industries and industry-specific skills become useless. Lagos (2006) 
claims that if stringent EPL raises reservation wages, average productivity can increase 
simply because firms become more selective and less productive matches are not realised. 
Bertola (2004) shows that the additional insurance via severance pay may also result 
in a productivity gain in the spirit of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), making workers more 
willing to leave their low-productive job to look for a more productive one. 
The empirical part of most of the papers reviewed, if present at all, is based on 
cross-country regressions on aggregate outcomes. However, this approach potentially 
suffers from well-known severe problems. First of all, reverse causality: the strictness of EPL 
may depend on labour market conditions. Second, omitted variables may bias the results: 
EPL may pick up the effect of other factors unobserved by the econometrician that drive 
the cross-country differences in labour market performance. Third, most studies focus on 
overall EPL, without distinguishing between EPL provisions for fixed-term and permanent 
contracts. 
As far as we know, very few studies go beyond country-level data. Scarpetta 
et al. (2002) analyse the effects of EPL and centralized bargaining on firm productivity 
and firm dynamics using harmonized data for 17 manufacturing industries in 18 countries, 
over the period 1984-1998. They find that strict EPL has a significant negative impact 
on productivity only in countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation/coordination 
in wage bargaining. 
Autor et al. (2007) study the impact of adoption of wrongful-discharge protection 
norms in the US, using cross-state differences in the timing of adoption. Exploiting microdata, 
they find that capital deepening is increased while TFP is reduced. Quantitatively, they 
calculate a drop in productivity, with an average elasticity in the order of 0.03 to 0.04. 
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Similar findings are provided by Cingano et al. (2008) using Italian data to examine a 1990 
reform that raised dismissal costs for firms with fewer than 15 employees only. 
Micco and Pagés (2004) analyse the difference in the effects of EPL across sectors 
within a certain country. They argue that EPL is more binding in sectors that are more 
susceptible to technological and demand shocks. They use data for the manufacturing sector 
for 18 countries during the 1980s and 1990s, and find a negative relationship between layoff 
costs and the level of labour productivity especially in those sectors with higher needs for 
flexibility. 
The paper closest to ours is Bassanini et al. (2009), which uses sectoral harmonized 
data from EUKLEMS for 17 industries in 18 industrial economies over the past two decades. 
They consider EPL together with other labour market institutions and the extent to which EPL 
is binding in particular industries. They find a negative effect of EPL on total factor productivity 
(TFP) and conclude that reforms of overly strict dismissal regulation in many OECD countries 
can be justified on the grounds of fostering TFP growth. 
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3 Empirical Framework 
In order to describe the identification strategy that allows us to estimate the joint effect 
of labour and financial market imperfections, we proceed in two steps. In section 3.1 
we describe the identification strategy of EPL neglecting credit markets, and in section 3.2 
we extend our empirical framework to allow for the presence of (imperfect) capital markets. 
3.1 Identification of the average effect of EPL on firm-level outcomes 
Our empirical strategy relies on a well-established approach developed in the finance 
literature by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and recently adopted in labour studies [see Micco 
et al. (2004), Fonseca and Utrero (2006), Haltiwanger et al. (2006) and Bassanini et al. (2009) 
to estimate the impact of some country characteristic (often, measures of regulation] on 
economic performance accounting for geographical- and technological-specific time-invariant 
unobservables. The basic idea underlying the approach is to exploit the fact that while the 
amount of regulation is given for all firms within a country, its impact could be different if, 
due to technological characteristics or to the incidence of aggregate shocks, firms do differ 
as to the frequency or amount of required labour reallocation. In this case, the importance of 
employment protection legislation can be inferred by looking at whether firms requiring more 
reallocation see a better performance in countries with less restrictive legislation. 
The main problem with this approach is recovering a plausible measure of 
employment reallocation requirements. Job flows are in fact not customarily included among 
official statistics and even if they were observable at the firm or industry level, they would 
likely reflect idiosyncratic components endogenous to the level of EPL in each country. This 
implies they would in general not just reflect the amount of reallocation of a frictionless 
environment, where the extent of yearly flows only responds to, say, technological firm or 
industry differences. Hence, using actual labour reallocation is likely to yield biased estimates 
of the impact of EPL on performance. Following the influential study of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) on financial development, one popular approach to this problem is to proxy for firms’ 
characteristics in the absence of distortions using data from a flexible market economy. 
For example, Micco and Pages (2004), Haltiwanger et al. (2006) and Bassanini et al. (2009) 
use reallocation figures computed for US industries. Their underlying assumption is that such 
baseline should proxy for the technological and market driven employment reallocation 
across industries in the absence of policy-induced costs of adjustment. 
Applying this approach implies estimating the standard differences-in-differences 
specification of studies exploiting cross-country cross-industry data: 
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ijt DXE)BenchFlowE(Y    (1) 
 
where Ycijt is the outcome variable of firm i in country c, industry j at time t; Ect is a 
country-varying index of employment protection legislation; BenchFlowj is the extent of 
“intrinsic” job reallocation in sector j (below we describe the different proxies used in this 
paper). The various specifications encompass different sets of year-, industry- and country- 
effects (respectively ),, cjt   and their interactions D. The matrix Xcijt includes firm-level 
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control variables and cijt  is the residual. We take care of the intra-cluster correlation of 
standard errors. 
Equation (1) allows to estimate the average effect of EPL exploiting variability at the 
country-sector-time level in the relationship between employment legislation and outcomes. 
At this stage, we do not include firms fixed effects because they would wash away all the 
industry by country variation making the identification of the variable of interest (Ebenchflow) 
rely only on the (limited) time variation of the EPL index. 
The coefficient  in equation (1) captures the effect of employment regulation on 
the variable of interest. One way to interpret  is thinking of the average difference in the 
variable of interest Y between two industries characterized by high and low reallocation flows 
(say, corresponding to the 10th and 90th percentile of the observed distribution, respectively). 
Then estimates of  in equation (1) can be thought of as the implied change in such 
differential as employment protection is increased by an arbitrary amount (say, equivalent to 
the 10th-90th difference observed across countries). 
Following the standard benchmark-country approach would require proxying the 
sectoral intrinsic need for job reallocation using data from the most flexible market economy 
available (the US or, in our sample, the UK). The appropriateness of the benchmark-country 
approach can however be questioned along two dimensions. First, the validity of the 
benchmark hinges on the representativeness of the industry in the benchmark country, 
within the set of countries covered in the sample. Even if US reallocation rates in a given 
industry are a good proxy of the intrinsic needs of reallocation in that sector, it might be 
the case that within sector heterogeneity across countries limits the comparative exercise. 
An example illustrates well this problem. If the researcher is using benchmark flows measures 
at the 2-digit industry level of aggregation, the reallocation in sector 35 “Manufacture of 
Transport Equipment” in the US, would serve as benchmark reallocation for the remaining 
countries in the sample. However, going finer in the industry classification one finds that 
industry 35 is composed, among others, of sub-sectors 3511 “Building and repairing ships 
and boats”, 3530, “Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft” and 3542 “Manufacture of 
bicycles”. The benchmarking requires that either intrinsic needs of reallocation in the three 
sub-sectors are similar, or that the average within sector industry mix in every country in 
the sample is well proxied by the average industry mix in the US. A finer level of aggregation 
of the benchmark would limit this problem. 
Second, the benchmark-country approach has been questioned for representing a 
measure of short- rather than long-term industry-differences [Fisman and Love (2003)]. 
This would imply in our case that the benchmark constitutes a noisy proxy of frictionless 
(or technological) industry reallocation requirements. In a recent paper, Ciccone and 
Papaioannou (2006) have formalized this problem by showing that if the benchmark reflects, 
among other factors, idiosyncratic shocks, then the measurement error stemming from 
country-benchmarking can induce both upward and downward biases in the estimates of  
in (1). In our case, if employment reallocation across industries in the benchmark country 
correlates more closely with reallocation in low-EPL countries than in high-EPL countries, 
then one might find significant effects of regulation even if there were not. 
To circumvent the problem Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006 and 2007) proposed a 
methodology to construct a world-average benchmark measure not reflecting idiosyncratic 
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factors specific to a country or regulatory environment. Exploiting the availability of industry 
(or firm-) specific figures of job reallocation JRjc, such a measure can be obtained in our case 
regressing job reallocation measured at a detailed industry level on country dummies 
interacted with time dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies interacted with 
country-level EPL: 
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where the interaction term ctj E  allows to absorb the marginal effect of employment 
protection on job reallocation in each industry j, and ct  accounts for time-varying differences 
at the country level. Hence jˆ captures the extent of industry job reallocation in a country not 
subject to firing restrictions (we are controlling for EPL), which is subject to world average 
supply and demand shocks. This is the measure of frictionless sectoral reallocation 
(BenchFlowj = jˆ ) in equation (1) that will be used in the paper. Hence, we collapse our firm 
level data (described below) at country-industry-year cells and run a regression following 
equation (2) in order to extract the jˆ ’s. The job reallocation rate is defined, following Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1990), as 
 
 

 

c,ji cijt
c
ijt
c
jit
c
ijtc
jt ee
ee
JR
1
12  
 
where subscripts are defined as above. In order to preserve a minimal level of 
representativeness in each cell, we drop all cells where job reallocation was computed for 
less than 10 firms. 
While the Ciccone-Papaioannou methodology allows avoiding country-specific 
idiosyncrasies, its main limitation is that, since no country in our sample has zero EPL, it 
computes trustworthy frictionless rates only under the assumption that out-of-sample 
predictions are reliable. For this reason, we check the robustness of this approach, by using 
as an alternative benchmark the sectoral job reallocation rates (averaged over time) of the 
country with the lowest level of EPL in our sample.2 Comparing the results obtained 
using the two alternative measures is interesting to assess to what extent widely used 
benchmark-country proxies reflect idiosyncratic shocks. 
Figure 1 below depicts the relationship between actual job reallocation in the UK, 
the country with the lowest level of EPL in our sample, measured at the 4-digit industry level 
(more than 400 sectors) with the measure obtained following equation (2). The picture shows 
that the actual UK job reallocation rate and the Ciccone-Papaioannou (2007) “frictionless” 
job reallocation measure are strongly positively related. The slope of the linear fit (dotted line) 
                                                                          
2. One can argue that the frictionless measure using only within sample countries has an endogeneity problem and that, 
insofar as the driving variable appears to be EPL on regular contracts, benchmarks based on layoffs would be 
more pertinent than benchmarks based on turnover (for example services are notoriously high turnover but low 
layoff industries). To address this problem we also used the sectoral layoff rates from the US (a country external 
to the sample) taken from Bassanini et al. (2009) as an alternative benchmark. Specifications based on this measure 
give insignificant but qualitatively similar results. This is likely due to the fact that this measure is available only for 16 
sector, rather than for the more than 400 sectors implied by the Amadeus 4-digit disaggregation. 
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is positive and significant. Although the relationship between both measures is positive and 
significant, it is different from a hypothetical 45% line, suggesting that UK job flows are a mix 
of world average and idiosyncratic needs for reallocation. 
 
Figure 1. Job reallocation in UK and world-average Ciccone-Papaioannou (2007) measure. 
 
Finally, notice that there might be an issue of endogeneity of regulations. It is likely, 
for example, that countries that experience high turnover rates have a high demand for strict 
employment protection legislation. Alternatively, countries with low employment creation may 
tend to protect existing jobs. An attempt to address the problem using instrumental variables 
can be found in Bassanini et al. (2009). Our approach allows us to use country (by time) and 
sector fixed effects to control for all observable and unobservable country and sector 
characteristics. In particular, it allows to control for differences in country and sector output 
volatility, thus alleviating the potential problem of endogeneity of regulations present in 
cross-country regressions. In fact to claim endogeneity in our approach, one would have to 
argue that across countries a high level of turnover or low job creation in some sectors 
determines the level of employment protection in the whole country. 
3.2 Identification of the joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfections 
As explained in the introduction, the main contribution of our analysis lies in the study of the 
joint effect of EPL (labour market frictions) and financial constraints on the capital-labour ratio, 
investment and labour productivity. We therefore relate to the large literature that looks at 
the determinants of capital investment and finds access to the credit market to be one of the 
important factors affecting investment. 
Most empirical studies of investment and financing constraints, in the tradition 
of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) typically regress a measure of investment on a 
measure of investment opportunities (Tobin's q) as well as a measure of cash flow, i.e. they 
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estimate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow conditional on q. These empirical 
specifications imply that, in the absence of financing constraints, investment is likely to be 
subject to adjustment costs that prevent the capital stock adjusting continuously to maintain 
equality between the marginal revenue product and the user cost of capital. In the absence of 
financial frictions, Tobin’s q is a sufficient statistic for investment opportunities, which means 
that nothing but q should matter in investment equations. A positive correlation between 
investment and liquidity, conditional on q, is therefore taken as evidence of the presence of 
financial market imperfections that prevent positive net present value projects to be financed, 
possibly because of moral hazard problems. 
In this paper, differently, we study the joint effect of EPL and financial constraints on 
the outcome variables i.e. the differential effect of EPL on all outcome variables for financially 
constrained firms. The impact of credit and labour market imperfections on investment has 
been theoretically analyzed in Rendón (2004) and in Wasmer and Weil (2004), who showed 
that job creation is limited by financing constraints even in the presence of a flexible 
labour market. 
There are not many papers that investigate empirically the joint influence of 
imperfect financial and labour markets on investment, with the exception of Calcagnini 
and Giombini (2008). Their results show a negative correlation between EPL levels and 
investments. In particular they find that firms facing negative shocks see their financial 
constraints worsening in countries with greater labour market rigidities. 
The interaction of financial frictions and EPL is evaluated in our cross-country panel 
data framework exploiting the interaction between labour and financial market imperfections 
at the firm-level. To this purpose we augment our baseline specification (1) with the operating 
cash-flow of firm i at any observed year t-1. We take the lagged value of cash-flow in order 
to make sure that we measure liquidity before investments are made. Otherwise, reverse 
causality may be at work since high investments may generate low levels of liquidity. 
We interact cash-flow with EPL and Benchflows separately, and with their interaction 
EPLBenchflows, as described in the following equation: 
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and D is a vector of dummy variables including country by year interactions. The coefficient 3 
of third level interaction term )BenchFlowCFE( j
c
ijt
c
t  1  captures the effect of a change in 
EPL on investment – and on the other dependent variables – in firms with different levels of 
internal resources in sectors with different volatilities of employment. If higher levels of internal 
resources facilitate capital deepening (as in presence of credit constraints) then this 
interaction term should positively enter the investment per worker and K/L equations. 
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Since computing Tobin’s q requires information on the market value of the firm and 
the vast majority of firms in our sample are unlisted, in this work we will measure investment 
opportunities with the rate of Return on Assets (ROA in equation 3). 
Note that our specifications now include firm level fixed effects, since the variable of 
interest in this case is not an aggregate variable as in the previous specification, but varies 
over time within firms. In this context, it becomes crucial to control for any unobserved factor 
that remains constant within firms and might be correlated with the cash flow measure. 
One may in fact argue that firms able to produce a higher cash-flow have (1) easier access 
to credit but (2) are also typically larger and (3) behave differently along many (unobservable) 
dimensions. To the extent that these unobserved factors are time invariant, they are 
accounted for by firms fixed effects. 
To test the robustness of our results we use two measures of internal resources. 
The first is operating cash-flow. The second, following Cleary, Povel and Raith (2005), 
is a stock measure of liquidity called net liquid assets, described in detail in the robustness 
section. 
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4 Data description 
Our main data source is Amadeus, a firm level data set collected by the Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD) containing balance-sheet information of European firms.3 The information is gathered 
by specialized national service providers and is homogenised applying uniform formats in 
order to allow accurate cross-country comparisons. We used the largest version of Amadeus 
in its 2006 DVD format, which covers firms of all sizes for the period 1994-2005. However, 
the coverage prior to 1997 is relatively limited. Similarly, EPL data is only available up 
to 2003. Hence, we restrict the analysis to the period 1997-2003, but robustness 
checks adding these additional years are provided in Section 7. The 14 countries under 
study are: Belgium, the Czeck Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.4 
The limitations of this firm-level dataset are well-known. First, what the data 
company is able to report depends on how demanding the accounting standards of a 
country are and which firms indeed report. Therefore, without any doubt, the sample is 
biased toward countries with more demanding accounting standards and more transparent 
firms. If anything, this sample selection bias should make it harder to find a significant impact 
of financial market imperfections on firms’ response to stricter EPL. Moreover, in any given 
country, the sample may not be representative of the underlying population. In principle this 
problem could be addressed by cross-checking our results (at least those not involving 
firm-specific measures among the variables of interest) against estimates obtained 
running the corresponding regressions at a more aggregate level using information from 
country-industry datasets. In practice, this strategy is largely undermined by the significant 
lack of data on investment and capital stocks at the industry level. For example, the 
increasingly used Euklems dataset assembling industry-level accounts for EU members at 
a 2-digit level of disaggregation lacks information on capital stock for countries as France, 
Spain and Belgium, which constitute a relevant share of observations in our sample. 
Unfortunately, the OECD Stan dataset, a possible alternative source of data even though with 
a coarser industry breakdown, also present a significant fraction of missing values as regards 
the stock of capital. To get reassured that Amadeus firms does not completely misrepresent 
the population distribution we aggregated our data to the corresponding Euklems 
industry-level breakdown and computed correlations between country-industry shares of 
employment and value added in the two datasets (such information is available in Euklems 
for all countries in our sample). In 2003, the correlation is 0.44 in the case of employment 
and 0.35 in the case of value added. 
                                                                          
3. See Messina and Vallanti (2007) and Konings et al. (2005) for descriptions of Amadeus in different research contexts. 
Giannangeli and Gómez-Salvador (2008) use Amadeus in an study of the sources of growth in manufacturing 
productivity in five European countries. 
4. We tried to cover all countries in Amadeus for which EPL data from the OECD was available. Austria and Germany 
constitute special cases in Amadeus. Most firms in these two countries have limited information on their balance sheets, 
including employment and very few financial items. After data cleaning, this results in insufficient observations in the 
case of Austria for most of the specifications. Hence, Austria is dropped from the analysis. Slovakia, Ireland and 
Hungary were also dropped due to small samples. There are very few German firms too in the sample, but sufficient 
to be present in most country, year and sector cells. The analysis in the paper includes Germany, and robustness 
checks excluding specific countries are discussed at the end of the paper. 
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Despite the above described limitations the use of Amadeus is becoming 
widespread in the economic profession for several reasons. First, the reclassification of the 
balance sheets appears reliable, since no attempt is made to reconstruct items that are 
missing from the original balance sheets or difficult to reconstruct. In fact, many variables 
are missing, especially for firms incorporated in countries where accounting practices are 
less transparent. Another important advantage of Amadeus is that most of the firms 
included in the data set are private, allowing to focus on a sample that is more representative 
than the listed companies typically analysed in studies on credit markets [see Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995 and Boot, et al. (2001)]. This naturally entails some shortcomings given 
that the information available for private firms is less detailed. Moreover, since private firms 
are not traded, only book values are available and it is not possible to evaluate the 
market values of debt ratios, which would provide useful additional information. However, 
this shortcoming are not likely to hamper the analysis because previous studies [Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Boot et al. (2001)] do not find any significant differences in factors 
correlated with debt to book and market capital. 
For the aims of this paper the advantages of looking at a panel of balance sheet 
data for firms in different countries largely prevail over the disadvantages. First and foremost, 
the availability of balance sheet data allows us to study whether and to what extent labour 
market regulation interacts with financial constraints when firms react to aggregate or 
idiosyncratic shocks. This analysis simply cannot be performed on sectoral data.5 Second, 
even when focusing on the average effects of employment protection, the use of firm-level 
data is advisable, as one can account for industry and country specific unobserved 
characteristics in ways that studies based on aggregate data are unable to correct for. This 
makes our study less subject to miss-specification and omitted variable biases. Finally, the 
firm-level data is classified at a very detailed industry dimension (4-digit NACE classification). 
The possibility of constructing the benchmark “frictionless” job flow measure at such a refined 
level of aggregation helps us limiting possible problems of comparability of industries 
discussed above. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 reports the average values of our variables of interest by country, thus giving a visual 
representation of the descriptive statistics by country presented in Table 1. The upper left 
panel reports both EPL levels (averages in 1997-2003) and changes (from 1997 to 2003) 
and shows that the United Kingdom displays the lowest level of EPL in our sample period 
while Portugal displays the highest. It is noteworthy (and also well-known) that EPL varies 
very little over time. The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that most countries display very 
little or no variation of EPL over time, with the exception of Italy. Table 2, which reports 
descriptive statistics by year, shows that average EPL ranges from 2.44 and 2.56 over our 
sample period. This is why we do not include firms’ FE in the estimation of equation (1). 
The remaining panels of Figure 2 show the average levels of capital per worker, value added 
per worker and investment per worker. Germany and Belgium exhibit the highest values of all 
of them (except I/L, where Poland ranks higher than Belgium) while the United Kingdom 
ranks very low both for investment and for capital. 
                                                                          
5. Few recent papers addressed a similar issue in a totally different framework, i. e. studying the determinants of 
corporate control [(Atanassov and Kim (2008), Pagano and Volpin (2005), Bozcaya and Kerr (2008)]. 
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However, the most interesting statistics are perhaps those presented in table 1, 
where we show the average levels of job reallocation, capital per worker, value added per 
worker and investment per worker in high and low job reallocation sectors and high and 
low EPL countries, where we take as low (high) job reallocation sectors those below (above) 
the 25th (75th) percentile of the distribution of the frictionless job reallocation and as low (high) 
EPL countries those below (above) the 25th (75th) percentile of the distribution of EPL. The list 
of the low- and high- reallocation sectors is in the note to the table. 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary Statistics by Country 
 
We perform an unconditional diff-in-diff exercise that mimics our identification 
strategy in equation (1). The results of this exercise, while allowing a better understanding of 
our identification strategy, should be taken with caution because (1) the regression exercise is 
based on a continuous treatment [i.e. in the regressions we will not arbitrarily divide sectors 
into two groups but rather use the Ciccone-Papaioannou (2007) continuous measure of 
intrinsic job reallocation] and (2) because of the presence of aggregate confounding factors. 
Notice, for example, that in our data Job Reallocation (first row) is higher in high EPL 
countries, both in sectors classified as displaying low and high (intrinsic) needs of job 
reallocation. This suggests the existence of a positive correlation between employment 
legislation and turnover at the aggregate level, as in the case in which countries tend to have 
higher levels of protection in response to exogenously induced increases in flows (e.g. a deep 
restructuring of the productive structure). That is one of the reasons why our analysis will 
look at within-country effects of EPL exploiting a diff-in-diff approach as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). Moreover, it suggests that using country-specific reallocation rates might 
induce severe biases because reallocation might responds to country-specific legislation. 
Our attempt to construct a world-average benchmark measure not reflecting idiosyncratic 
factors specific to a country or regulatory environment aims at addressing this issue. 
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Overall, table 3 shows a negative unconditional effect of EPL on job reallocation and value 
added per worker, while the industry-level differential in capital and investment intensities 
seem to increase. As we will see, the conditional continuous-treatment version of this 
approach points to substantially different results as far as investment and capital per worker 
are concerned. 
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5 Results: average effect of EPL  
In this section we document the relevance of employment regulations exploiting differences in 
sector characteristics to implement a difference-in-differences estimation method. We first 
look at the effects on capital and investment normalized by unit of labour (section 5.1). 
Then we look at the effects on labour productivity and for comparison with previous studies 
we assess whether employment protection legislation affects the level of job reallocation 
(section 5.2). In section 6 we move to the analysis of the role of internal resources in firms 
responses to stricter firing restrictions. 
5.1 Capital and investment per worker 
The five columns of Table 2 show that EPL reduces the capital-labour ratio in firms operating 
in the most affected sectors. The first column includes country, year and sector dummies 
(438 four digits dummies) to absorb institutional, technological and time specific effects. 
In the second column we include industry-by-time dummies to control for differential trends 
by industry in the outcome variable. For example some industries may experience faster 
(e.g. the computer industry) or lower-than-average (e.g. manufacturing) capital adjustment or 
job reallocation or productivity growth in all countries. In the same column we also include 
country-by-time dummies to control for all country-specific time-varying characteristics 
(for example all national-level institutions) which have the same effects across industries. 
Notice that this set of dummies absorbs the main effect of EPL, as this variable only varies by 
country and time.6 
In table 2 we find strong adverse effects of employment protection on capital-labour 
ratios. The coefficient on the interaction is strongly significant and in the neighbourhood of 
-0.40. In order to get an idea of their magnitude, consider the ratio of capital-intensity 
between industry 1561 "Manufacture of grain mills product" and industry 2955 "Manufacture 
of machinery for paper or paperboard production", the two industries we estimate at the 10th 
and 90th percentile of the capital-labour ratios distribution. Then our estimates imply that 
reducing employment protection from the level Greece in 1997 to that in Ireland the same 
year (this shift correspond to the 90th to the 10th percentile of the country-by-year EPL 
distribution in our sample) would increase such ratio by 12%. 
In a first attempt to control for heterogeneity, the third column includes firm-level 
controls (firm-size, exports and number of subsidiaries).7 In the fourth column we aggregate 
Amadeus data at the industry level and we run regressions at the industry level to ease 
comparison with results obtained by previous literature using EUKLEMS data [Bassanini 
et al. (2009)]. In both columns 3 and 4 the results are qualitatively unchanged with respect to 
the first two columns. The last column of tables 2 uses sectoral job turnover in the UK as 
                                                                          
6. Note that while we study firm-level outcomes, our variable of interest in equation (1), the interaction term 
EPL  benchflows, varies at the four-digit industry level in 14 countries and 7 years. We take care of the intra-cluster 
correlation of standard errors likely to arise in all the specifications discussed. 
7. Exports and number of subsidiaries display non missing values only for a relatively limited number of observations. 
As for these variables the non missing values are always strictly positive, it is plausible to interpret them as zeros. We do 
so and check the robustness of this assumption adding one additional control at the time. We find that the results are 
unchanged. 
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benchmark to test the robustness of our frictionless measure. The results are qualitatively 
similar and will be further commented upon in the robustness section. 
We then turn to examine the effect of employment protection legislation on 
investment. We report the results in Table 3 for investment normalized by units of labour, 
as this is the relevant variable in models of hold-up. 
Results in columns 1 to 5 indicate a significant negative effect of EPL on investment 
over labour units. The coefficient in columns 1, 2 and 3 lies around -0.2 and is strongly 
significant. To gauge the magnitude of the effects, we repeat the thought experiment of 
decreasing employment protection legislation from the 90th to the 10th percentile of the 
observed distribution. This implies an increase of 6.8% in the average I/L ratio between two 
industries at the 10th and 90th percentile of the observed distribution. 
Negative results on the capital-labour ratio are consistent with results on I/L that 
show that investment is actually falling relative to the units of labour employed (table 3). 
The overall picture shows a reduction in capital investment (relative to labour) in consequence 
of an increase in EPL as predicted from “hold up” theories (see section 2). 
5.2 Labour productivity and job reallocation 
In table 4 we explore the effect of EPL on labour productivity finding strong and significantly 
negative coefficients of around -0.27 (which can be quantified with the previous exercise 
in an increase of 8.6 percent in the average value added per worker ratio in high versus low 
reallocation industries). 
Regarding job reallocation, although the negative effect of EPL on job flows is well 
established (see references in section 2), most previous studies look at sectoral rather than 
firm level data. Our results are presented in Table 5. The coefficients estimated in columns 1 
and 2 are similar in magnitude (-0.052 and -0.044). In summary we find that the sign of the 
coefficient on the interaction terms is negative and statistically significant i.e. firms in more 
volatile industries present lower levels of job reallocation in countries with more stringent 
employment protection laws. These results are in line with most of the previous literature on 
EPL and job flows. 
In order to get an idea of the magnitude of the effects, we consider the differential in 
the (average) reallocation rate between the two industries at the 10th and 90th percentile of the 
computed distribution of “frictionless” reallocation. Then our estimates imply that reducing 
employment protection from the level of Greece in 1997 to that in Ireland the same year 
(this shift correspond to the 90th to the 10th percentile of the country-by-year EPL distribution 
in our sample) increases yearly reallocation by 1,4 percentage points, against a median 
reallocation rate of firms in our sample of 5.7%. 
The negative results on labour productivity are consistent with previous empirical 
literature [e.g. Autor et al. (2007) and Bassanini et al. (2009)] and are somewhat expected 
as we have assessed that EPL not only reduces job flows in table 5 (as in much of the 
previous literature) but also reduces capital investment per unit of labour (table 3) and 
the capital-labour ratio (table 2). If reallocation of labour is important and EPL hampers 
job reallocation across and within sectors, then productivity falls. Indeed, finding an effect 
of EPL on job reallocation is a pre-requisite to claim that dismissal restrictions hamper 
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the optimization of resources and allocative efficiency [Bertola (1990)]. On top of that, labour 
productivity also falls because capital investment per worker falls. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0914 
6 EPL and the role of Financial Market Imperfections 
We are now in the position to analyse the results on the joint effect of EPL and financial 
constraints on the outcome variables i.e. the differential effect of EPL on all outcome variables 
for financially constrained firms. Our empirical strategy, outlined in equation (3), amounts to 
evaluate whether there is a differential effect of EPL in firms with different levels of internal 
resources on the variables analysed so far: capital per worker, investment per worker, value 
added per worker and job reallocation rates. We build two different measures of financial 
liquidity, one based on the flow of internal resources potentially available for investment 
purposes (operating cash-flow) and, for robustness purposes, one based on the stock of 
internal resources (net liquid assets, see robustness section for details). 
As the financial variables that measure liquidity vary at the firm level, we are now able 
to control for any time-invariant unobserved firm characteristic that may affect the dependent 
variables while being correlated with the level of firms’ internal resources by the use of firms 
fixed effects, thus fully exploiting the firm-level dimension of the dataset. 
As before, we first look at the effect on capital and investment normalized by unit 
of labour and on the capital-labour ratio (section 6.1). Then we look at the effects on labour 
productivity and job reallocation (section 6.2). 
6.1 Capital and investment per worker 
Table 6 reports results on the ratio of capital to labour. The first column simply expands the 
specification reported in the second column of table 2 by adding firm cash-flow (and its 
interactions with respectively EPL, benchflows and EPLbenchflows) and the lagged value of 
ROA to control for the profitability of the firm. This column shows that the mere presence 
of firm-level measures of liquidity (and their interaction terms) in the estimating equation does 
not alter the result that EPL has a negative significant impact on K/L in high reallocation 
sectors relative to low reallocation sectors, as shown by the negative and significant 
coefficient of EPL × BF.8 
To assess whether firms with higher levels of internal resources respond differently 
to EPL, we need to look at the coefficient of the triple interaction term EPL × BF × Internal 
Resources. The coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that the negative effect 
of EPL on the capital-labour ratio is larger the higher the level of internal resources of 
the firm. This counterintuitive results is likely driven by composition effects at the industry 
level, as firms producing larger cash-flow not only have higher collateral and easier access 
to credit, but are also different along other dimensions, such as growth prospects and 
exporting propensity. 
For this reason the second column includes firms fixed effects and therefore controls 
for all firms’ time-invariant unobserved characteristics that may be correlated with cash-flow, 
thus identifying the effects of interest from contrasts of within-firm changes. We now find that 
EPL still reduces the capital-labour ratio, but less so in firms with higher internal resources 
                                                                          
8. Note, however, that this effect is evaluated at zero-cash flow, but simulations at values at the 90th and 10th percentile 
of the cash-flow distribution show that the effect is always negative and statistically significant. 
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as the coefficient on EPL × BF × Internal Resources is now positive and significant. Having a 
high cash flow thus reduces significantly the negative effect on the capital-labour ratio or 
equivalently, from the point of view of financially constrained firms, they have to reduce capital 
more when EPL increases and they are “held up” by the request of higher wages. This result 
is robust to the inclusion of country by year dummies (column 3); the use of a different 
measure of liquidity (column 4, further discussed in the robustness section); additional 
firm-level controls (column 5) and the use of UK job turnover as an alternative proxy for the 
frictionless job reallocation rate (column 6). 
We have interpreted the negative effect of EPL on capital investment and the 
capital-labour ratio in the basic specification of equation (1) along the lines of the “hold up” 
theory. The results of equation (3), which looks at differential effects depending on the internal 
financial structure of firms, are consistent with the same view: the presence of stricter EPL 
disincentives the use of internal funds for financing new investments: i.e. if capital is largely 
sunk and high EPL favours ex-post profit appropriation by workers, firms will use their internal 
funds to pay higher wages and will invest less. This is all the more true for financially 
constrained firms with low liquidity. 
Table 7 turns to the results on investment per worker. It shows in all columns 
that having a high cash-flow does not make any difference for the negative impact 
on investment per unit of labour as coefficient on EPL × BF × Internal Resources is always 
insignificant, except for column 4 which uses net liquid assets and shows that in the face of 
high EPL more liquid firms tend to invest more. 
We speculate that the absence of a differential effect on the investment level of firms 
with different levels of liquidity may be due to the lumpy nature of the investment process, 
as investments episodes tend to be rare and of substantial magnitude. Indeed in our data, 
more than 6% of observations on investments are zero and the observed distribution is 
extremely skewed to the left. 
6.2 Labour productivity and job reallocation 
Table 8 considers labour productivity. Overall, the results indicate that the negative impact 
of EPL does not seem to depend of the level firms’ internal resources as the coefficient on 
EPL × BF × Internal Resources is always insignificant, except for column 6 which uses UK job 
reallocation. 
Finally, we do not find any differential effect of EPL on job reallocation depending on 
the level of internal resources either (table 9 except for column 4 which uses net liquid 
assets). 
Summing up, the result on capital per worker seems to favour the interpretation that 
financial constraints exacerbate the negative effects of EPL on capital deepening. However, 
we take this finding as suggestive but only tentative as, when we turn to investments, we find 
no (or at best only weak) evidence of a differential effect of EPL on firms with different levels 
of liquid resources, a result possibly due to the lumpiness of the investment process which 
deserves further exploration. Finally, neither value added per worker nor job reallocation are 
affected differentially by EPL in firms with different levels of internal resources. 
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7 Robustness checks 
In this section, we provide a number of robustness checks for our baseline 
regressions. We test robustness with respect to a) benchmark measure of job reallocation; 
b) balanced-unbalanced samples; c) the specification of the equation; d) exclusions of 
specific sectors or countries; e) the measure of EPL; f) the firm-level measure of internal 
resources. 
a) The last column of tables 2 to 9 uses UK turnover as benchmark to test the 
robustness of our benchmark measure. The results show that in all cases the results 
are negative and larger than with the Ciccone-Papaioannou measure except for the case of 
table 5 (job reallocation) where “EPL × FJR” is now insignificant and for the case of table 8 
(VA/L) where the coefficient of interest “EPL × FJR × Internal Resources” becomes 
significant. The difference between the UK reallocation benchmark and the world-average 
measure reflect the idiosyncrasies of the UK labour market as explained in the data section. 
b) The sample is unbalanced, therefore includes entry of new firms and exit. 
Thus, the overall effect we measure includes both the direct impact on incumbent firms 
and the indirect compositional effect through entry and exit. However, we are not able to 
disentangle the two effects primarily because firms can enter or exit the Amadeus 
sample for many reasons (e.g. merger, acquisition, change of name, change in the obligation 
to provide/have a balance sheet) that prevent us from reliably measuring the true entry 
and exit. To try and have an idea of the extent to which our effects are due to the churning 
of firms, we compare the results obtained on the unbalanced sample (which includes entry 
and exit) with results on a balanced sample of firms that stay in sample every year from 1997 
to 2003. We have a bit less than 500.000 of such firms in the sample. We find that the results 
on the balanced sample are virtually the same as on the unbalanced sample. If anything, they 
are quantitatively stronger. 
c) We also run regressions where the dependent variable is in growth rates rather 
than levels, to allow for the possibility that EPL might affect the growth rate of variables rather 
than levels. However, notice that investment per worker (I/L) and Job Reallocation are already 
growth rates (I/L is precisely the rate of change of K/L). Therefore we regressed the rate of 
change of VA/L on EPL (including the interaction terms with firms internal resources) and 
found no differential effect of EPL in firms with larger levels of internal resources, very much 
as in the case of the variable in levels. Additionally, one may also worry that our variables may 
be affected by past EPL. However, these effects are likely to be captured by the current level 
of EPL given the well-known limited time variability of EPL, and by country and time 
dummies. 
d) We assess the impact of the exclusion of specific sectors in the regression. 
We have used our preferred specification, which includes sector by year and country by year 
fixed effects (and corresponds to columns 2 in tables 2 to 5). Hence, identification relies 
in within country variation across sectors, in the spirit of the original contribution of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). Dropping one sector at a time never turns the sign of our variable of interest, 
the interaction of EPL with benchmark flows, which remains negative when JR, I/L, K/L and 
VA/L are the dependent variables in each of the 446 regressions. Moreover, the coefficients 
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are always statistically significant at the 10% level, the t-statistics ranging from 3.2 to 5.69 
in the case of JR, from 1.65 to 3 in the case of I/L, from 2.37 to 3.52 in K/L regressions and 
from 1.89 to 3.16 (except one single case where the t-statistic is 1.38) when the dependent 
variable is VA/L. 
 
 
Figure 3. Effect of EPL on K/L, I/L, VA/L and JR excluding one country at the time 
 
Our next exercise examines the impact of the presence of specific countries in the 
sample. Figure 3 shows the impact of dropping one country at a time in each of our outcome 
variables, focusing on the specification that includes country by year and sector by year fixed 
effects. The estimates presented in the text are relatively stable when specific countries are 
excluded from the sample. In all the cases the estimated effects retain their negative sign, 
with one notable exception; the interaction term EPLBenchFlows in the labour productivity 
regression becomes positive when the UK is excluded from the sample. The exclusion of 
France from JR regressions (and of France and UK for I/L regressions) also somewhat 
dampens the negative sign, as the coefficient of the interaction term, although retaining its 
negative sign, becomes non-significant at standards levels of testing. 
e) EPL data is available up to 2003, while our firm level dataset contains information 
for 2004 and 2005. We have investigated a possible extension of the OECD EPL index. 
The Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti has collected information on EPL reforms in the 
period 1986-2005 and classifies them in structural and marginal, depending on the scope 
of the regulatory change. None of the countries in our sample experienced structural 
EPL reforms during 2004-2005, but some did follow marginal reforms. We have repeated 
our regressions under the assumption that the EPL levels remain constant in each 
country after 2003, and results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar to those 
presented here. Extending the sample backwards up to 1994 (where we have fewer firms), 
does not seem to alter either the nature of our estimates. 
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Finally, we look at differential effects of employment protection for temporary and 
permanent workers. For this purpose, we introduce in turn the sub-indices that the 
OECD (2004) provides for these two contractual figures. As in the case with the overall 
strictness of EPL index, these indices range from 0 to 6 according to the increasing strictness 
of regulations. The results suggest a stronger effect of regulation for regular contracts than for 
temporaries. The effect of both indices is negative in the investment and labour productivity 
regressions, but the magnitude of EPL for temporary contracts is almost 10 times smaller 
than for regular contracts (and non-statistically different from zero in the case of I/L). Similarly, 
the negative impact of EPL for regular contracts on the capital-labour ratio almost doubles 
the effect of temporary contracts. In both cases the coefficients are significant at standard 
levels of testing. 
f) We also test the robustness of our results with respect to the variable that proxies 
for firm liquidity. Following Cleary, Povel and Raith (2005), we use an alternative measure of 
internal resources, called net liquid assets. This is a stock measure of internal funds defined 
as current assets minus current liabilities which equals net working capital. The reason for 
adopting this stock measure is that measuring internal funds by using a flow variable, such as 
cash-flow, correctly accounts for current changes in internal funds but ignores existing funds 
carried over from the last period. Of course, measuring internal funds with a stock variable as 
(lagged) liquid assets, on the other hand, ignores all recent cash flow that is immediately 
invested and therefore never shows up in the end-of-period stock variable. For this reason, 
we use both variables. We include a specification in column 4 of each table from 6 to 9 that 
largely confirms the results obtained using cash-flow. 
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8 Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper is a first attempt to assess the joint impact of government mandate 
employment protection and financial market imperfections exploiting comparable micro-data 
in a cross-country context. 
We proceed in two steps. We first analyse the average effect of EPL on capital 
per worker, investment per worker and labour productivity. We find that EPL reduces all of 
them in high reallocation sectors relative to low reallocation sectors. The magnitude of the 
effect is economically not negligible and lies around 12%, 6.8% and 8.6% of the difference 
in, respectively, the capital-labour ratio, investment per worker and labour productivity of 
high vs. low reallocation industries. 
These findings bring about potentially important policy implications. They suggest 
that the debate on the role of EPL needs to consider not only the direct effect on 
employment flows, but also the indirect impact due to distorted incentives on capital 
accumulation and investment. 
The first implication of these results is that investment subsidies, which usually 
do not take into account the possible distortions induced by EPL, may be insufficient. 
The second implication is that the distorted incentives for investment and their productivity 
effects (a substantial 8.6% of the difference between value added per worker in high vs. low 
reallocation industries) may slow down the structural change from manufacturing industries 
(low reallocation sectors) towards services (high reallocation sectors) as in Rogerson (2008). 
Our results also allow us entering into the debate on partial (in the sense of 
deregulating temporary contracts) versus comprehensive EPL reform. In many countries 
the reform of EPL has been partial. Overall the literature indicates important potential 
pitfalls related to partial reforms, and most authors seem to favour a reduction in EPL for 
permanent contracts. However, our results (the results with the EPL index for temporary 
contracts are much weaker) indicate that the partial EPL reform could help attenuating 
some of the disincentive effects on investment highlighted here, because temporary workers 
have lower bargaining power than permanent workers and reduce the incidence of the 
“hold up” problem. Temporary contracts have themselves ambiguous effects on productivity, 
depending on whether they act mainly as a ‘stepping stone’ or ‘dead end jobs’. 
Regarding the role of credit market imperfections in shaping firms’ response to strict 
employment protection, our results suggest that sectors and countries where access to 
credit is difficult are expected to have a lower capital stock per worker. At his stage, we take 
this finding as suggestive but only tentative as we find only weak (if any) evidence of a 
differential effect of EPL on investments in firms with different levels of liquid resources. 
This last finding is potentially quite important because, if correct, it provides 
confirmation that exogenous improvements in credit markets may alleviate the negative 
impact of labour market restrictions on capital deepening and technology adoption. 
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Some recent papers, e.g. Fella (2006) and Pissarides (2001 and 2004) highlight 
the productive role of EPL as (additional) insurance against income risk. The presence of 
unemployment insurance reduces the insurance gains from EPL but also more developed 
capital markets may have made it less costly for workers to deal with the unemployment 
risk by saving and borrowing on the capital market, again reducing the gains from insurance 
via EPL. Thus more liquid financial markets reduce the importance of EPL for workers. From 
the point of view of firms we find that firms with financial constraints reduce their capital stock 
per worker more, thus more liquid financial markets alleviate the hold-up problem. 
Hence, at the country level, and as far as efficiency is concerned, financially 
underdeveloped countries are the ones who would benefit the most from reductions in EPL. 
However, from the point of view of overall welfare, employment protection policies should be 
jointly evaluated with financial market frictions in the classic efficiency-equality trade-off: 
on the one hand, the negative effects of firing restrictions on firms’ efficiency are amplified in 
countries with severe financial market imperfections; on the other hand, workers benefit more 
from EPL precisely in those countries where financial markets are more underdeveloped. 
The reason is that EPL provides insurance from labour market risk, which is more valuable 
in countries where other insurance mechanisms are absent [Bertola (2004)]. By the same 
token countries with more liquid financial markets would benefit less in terms of productivity 
growth from the reduction of EPL, but it is also true that in these same countries the 
insurance role of firing restrictions is less important precisely because of the presence of 
more liquid financial markets. 
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9 Data Appendix 
This appendix describes the construction of the main variables used in the analysis. The unit 
of observation in Amadeus is the firm. We extract from the database the following 
variables from the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts: total assets, fixed assets, 
fixed tangible assets, value added, profit before taxes, cash-flow, net liquid assets, exports 
and depreciation. We add to this initial set the main sector of operation of the firm, 
the number of employees and the number of subsidiaries. 
All nominal series used in the analysis are deflated using 2-digit sectoral level 
(60 sectors) deflators of value added (benchmark year is 1995), and converted into Euros 
using sectoral PPP exchange rates at the same level of aggregation. The base country 
for PPPs is Germany. The deflator and PPP exchange rates are obtained from EUKLEMS. 
Investment in the paper is defined as the difference between book value of fixed 
assets in year t+1 and fixed assets in year t plus depreciation in year t+1. Using the series 
of investment properly deflated, we construct a new series of capital following the perpetual 
inventory method. For these purposes, we rely on the harmonized depreciation rates 
by industry obtained from EUKELMS. 
Value added and capital per worker (computed using the perpetual inventory 
method) are defined as the logarithm of the respective ratios, while investment per worker 
is the logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of investment and employment. This avoids dropping 
the zeros in this variable.9 Return on assets is defined as profit before taxes divided by 
total assets, while cash flows and net liquid assets are normalized by tangible assets in the 
previous accounting period.  Job reallocation at the firm level is defined in parallel with 
the sectoral definition of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). It is the absolute value of the change 
in employment between two consecutive periods divided by the average employment 
between both periods. Hence, it is a measure that treats symmetrically the creation and 
destruction of jobs and is bounded between 0 and 2. 
We trimmed outlier observations in several steps. We first drop 1% of each country 
sample constituted by the extreme values of both tails in the distribution of the key original 
variables (fixed assets, tangible assets, cash flow, profits, employment and value added). 
After constructing the ratios that will be used in the analysis, we further exclude observations 
whose difference with respect to the median (in absolute value) exceeds five times the 
absolute distance between the 75th and 25th percentile in the distribution. 
The resulting panel is highly unbalanced. In order to preserve the comparability 
across exercises using different dependent variables, we restrict the analysis presented in 
the paper to a reduced sample where we drop observations with missing fixed assets, 
employment or the ratio of cash flow over fixed assets in period t-1. The cash flow condition 
results in losing about one third of the sample. 
                                                                          
9. We have experimented with the raw values of the ratio, and dropping the zeros before taking the logarithmic 
transformation and results are not affected by this transformation. 
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We use the OECD measure of employment protection regulation [OECD (2004)].  
EPL refers to the institutions related to the dissolution of matches between firms and 
workers. Most notably, administrative and legal procedures including notice periods, 
severance pay and firing taxes. These arrangements may be the result of government 
legislation, collective labour agreements and/or individual contracts. 
The overall EPL indicator is a weighted average of 18 basic items. The items are 
grouped into EPL for: i) employment protection of regular workers against individual 
dismissal, ii) specific requirements for collective dismissals, and iii) regulation of temporary 
forms of employment. Within the EPL items for regular workers against individual dismissal 
we can again distinguish three subgroups: i) procedural inconveniences that the employer 
may face when starting the dismissal process, ii) legislative provisions that state under which 
conditions a dismissal is justified or fair, and iii) regulations on notice periods and severance 
pay. For each item the score is normalised on a scale from 0 to 6, where a higher score 
represents more strict regulation on the relevant item.10 
                                                                          
10. The OECD indicator has some well-known limitations. In particular, the weights of the various components 
are subjective and are attributed on the basis of legislative provisions, while in practice legislative provisions can be 
extended by contractual provisions, which are typically not incorporated in the indicator. Also, the interpretation of 
the regulations by the court generates variation in EPL strictness over time and across countries that is not captured 
by the indices, e.g. court decisions may be affected by underlying labour market performance [Ichino et al. (2003)]. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics by country 
  Country JR I/L K/L VA/L EPL 
        
Mean  BEL 0.152 9.5 64.418 58.961 2.2 
St. Dev   (0.233) (12.539) (83.392) (28.683) (0) 
Min   0 0 1 1.487 2.2 
Max   1.974 102.593 12263.46 522.272 2.2 
N   349027 339519 364724 34642 387902 
        
Mean  CZE 0.054 3.832 19.766 14.532 1.9 
St. Dev   (0.187) (4.953) (23.325) (11.233) (0) 
Min   0 0 1.001 1.012 1.9 
Max   1.941 84.625 414.271 188.697 1.9 
N   14876 12260 14509 6681 16000 
        
Mean  DEU 0.078 10.933 70.181 64.665 2.444 
St. Dev   (0.132) (13.652) (110.186) (33.209) (0.073) 
Min   0 0 1.123 5.414 2.35 
Max   1.589 117.46 1436.537 370.062 2.5 
N   2512 1878 2435 2442 2758 
        
Mean  DNK 0.124 4.849 24.923 56.152 1.4 
St. Dev   (0.189) (6.571) (28.232) (32.499) (0) 
Min   0 0 1 2.226 1.4 
Max   1.978 52.062 561.5 380.262 1.4 
N   65293 52730 65481 30971 70197 
        
Mean  ESP 0.172 5.462 23.294 30.684 3.02 
St. Dev   (0.242) (7.576) (31.134) (16.85) (0.098) 
Min   0 0 1 1 2.9 
Max   1.98 60.015 6247.4 187.828 3.1 
N   609169 527234 626615 649027 687901 
        
Mean  FIN 0.117 5.344 19.328 39.677 2.04 
St. Dev   (0.199) (7.509) (25.299) (21.348) (0.049) 
Min   0 0 1 1.006 2 
Max   1.86 61.178 1938.718 734.945 2.1 
N   65471 51378 64185 60227 71210 
        
Mean  FRA 0.119 2.424 13.229 37.045 3 
St. Dev   (0.177) (3.104) (78.598) (22.699) (0) 
Min   0 0 1 1.057 3 
Max   1.968 22.78 37662.27 3751.063 3 
N   624689 558202 617973 520317 688799 
        
Mean  GBR 0.121 3.792 21.803 32.473 0.655 
St. Dev   (0.17) (4.773) (22.886) (22.241) (0.045) 
Min   0 0 1 1.009 0.6 
Max   1.984 50.516 772.072 449.539 0.7 
N   208488 173950 205436 161299 230928 
        
Note: Capital, investment and value added are expressed in thousands of 1995 German Euros.  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics by country (continued) 
Mean  GRC 0.051 7.663 32.43 - 3.381 
St. Dev   (0.16) (11.562) (37.036) - (0.263) 
Min   0 0 1 - 2.8 
Max   1.939 142.821 996.7 - 3.5 
N   45811 44813 47598 0 50709 
        
Mean  ITA 0.189 9.929 41.161 47.285 2.416 
St. Dev   (0.235) (12.587) (52.424) (23.867) (0.406) 
Min   0 0 1.001 1.033 1.9 
Max   1.98 118.55 9075.759 412.342 3.26 
N   335561 299496 336108 346551 375985 
        
Mean  NLD 0.118 6.833 32.504 61.187 2.152 
St. Dev   (0.181) (8.591) (39.97) (37.606) (0.168) 
Min   0 0 1.033 3.389 2.1 
Max   1.969 71.258 444.661 398.823 2.7 
N   8127 5766 7839 6687 8644 
        
Mean  POL 0.345 10.086 29.96 25.429 1.48 
St. Dev   (0.553) (25.013) (79.881) (51.419) (0.162) 
Min   0 0 1 1.009 1.24 
Max   1.966 715.802 2348.037 960.591 1.7 
N   15024 13356 15393 11802 16832 
        
Mean  PRT 0.11 9.472 31.223 29.946 3.7 
St. Dev   (0.164) (11.668) (27.912) (17.746) (0) 
Min   0 0 1.043 1.907 3.7 
Max   1.636 99.328 363.005 208.223 3.7 
N   3378 1985 3268 3357 3559 
        
Mean  SWE 0.104 3.133 18.335 26.249 2.2 
St. Dev   (0.201) (4.583) (258.488) (27.557) (0) 
Min   0 0 1 1 2.2 
Max   1.981 67.85 78835.06 1920.626 2.2 
N   339891 320127 343621 327447 386296 
        
Mean  Total 0.142 5.506 28.201 35.46 2.474 
St. Dev   (0.218) (8.835) (108.568) (24.049) (0.697) 
Min   0 0 1 1 0.6 
Max   1.984 715.802 78835.06 3751.063 3.7 
N   2687317 2402694 2715185 2161450 2997720 
        
Note: Capital, investment and value added are expressed in thousands of 1995 German Euros.  
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics by year 
  Year JR I/L K/L VA/L EPL 
        
Mean  1997 0.143 6.538 26.769 38.079 2.563 
St. Dev   (0.209) (9.615) (36.109) (22.058) (0.819) 
Min   0 0 1 1 0.6 
Max   1.959 117.46 1436.537 300.506 3.7 
N   214629 195799 229329 165680 237506 
        
Mean  1998 0.147 6.415 26.869 36.052 2.479 
St. Dev   (0.215) (9.503) (35.517) (21.991) (0.719) 
Min   0 0 1 1 0.6 
Max   1.969 101.085 1238.155 324.471 3.7 
N   262352 240803 278686 206439 290602 
        
Mean  1999 0.147 6.414 26.518 36.302 2.475 
St. Dev   (0.231) (11.126) (38.698) (23.861) (0.67) 
Min   0 0 1 1.005 0.6 
Max   1.98 715.802 2348.037 960.591 3.7 
N   348287 322696 369759 279540 389642 
        
Mean  2000 0.15 5.558 27.148 36.086 2.481 
St. Dev   (0.233) (8.729) (38.224) (21.782) (0.64) 
Min   0 0 1 1.013 0.68 
Max   1.98 98.253 3000.106 604.335 3.7 
N   395333 364093 421273 324152 447728 
        
Mean  2001 0.15 5.043 27.52 35.438 2.442 
St. Dev   (0.222) (7.991) (40.927) (22.843) (0.701) 
Min   0 0 1 1.003 0.68 
Max   1.981 102.302 4287.555 1386.365 3.7 
N   455098 417483 473935 368305 510595 
        
Mean  2002 0.136 4.796 28.302 34.365 2.474 
St. Dev   (0.211) (7.554) (62.994) (24.576) (0.694) 
Min   0 0 1 1.002 0.7 
Max   1.984 85.243 17624.67 1913.918 3.7 
N   512722 463466 520229 422183 578153 
        
Mean  2003 0.129 4.975 33.028 34.134 2.453 
St. Dev   (0.203) (8.048) (254.416) (27.865) (0.687) 
Min   0 0 1 1.006 0.7 
Max   1.975 142.821 78835.06 3751.063 3.7 
N   498896 398354 421974 395151 543494 
        
Note: Capital, investment and value added are expressed in thousands of 1995 German Euros.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by EPL and (frictionless) job reallocation level  
     
 Low Job Reallocation High Job Reallocation  Diff-in-diff 
 Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL   
JR 0,122 0,149 0,144 0,169  -0,00168 
 (0,23) (0,229) (0,224) (0,241)  [0,00167] 
I/L 1,799 1,933 1,716 1,950  0,1005 
 (0,764) (0,793) (0,728) (0,804)  [0,0073] 
K/L 2,906 2,904 2,624 2,646  0,0225 
 (1,08) (1,052) (1,063) (1,106)  [0,0078] 
VA/L 3,293 3,346 3,451 3,380  -0,1238 
 (0,752) (0,56) (0,673) (0,521)  [0,0053] 
       
Note: High EPL countries are those above the 75th percentile of the sample distribution: Greece, 
Portugal, Italy (1997) and Spain (1997-2000). Low EPL countries are those below the 25th 
percentile of the sample distribution: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy (2001-2003), the 
Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. Similarly, low (high) job reallocation sectors those 
below (above) the 25th (75th) percentile of the distribution of the frictionless job reallocation. At the 
2-digit level, industries that account for more than 50% of observations in high job-reallocation 
industries at the 4-digit level include: Construction; Collection, purification and distribution of 
water; Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment; Land transport; Post and 
telecommunications; Computer and related activities. Low job reallocation industries include: 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; Manufacture of wearing apparel; Recycling; 
Forestry, logging and related service activities; Air transport; Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers. Standard deviations in parentheses. Standard errors in square brackets. 
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Table 2. Effect of EPL on capital per worker 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
EPL 0.065 - - - - 
 (0.029)** - - - - 
EPL × 
Benchflow -0.376 -0.391 -0.453 -0.440 -1.231 
 (0.132)*** (0.121)*** (0.007)*** (0.120)*** (0.188)*** 
      
Observations 2040236 2040236 2040241 30411 1885882 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.89 0.26 
      
Sector FE YES - - - - 
Country FE YES - - - - 
Year FE YES - - - - 
Sector × Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Country × Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO 
      
Level of 
aggregation Firm Firm Firm Sector Firm 
Proxy for 
Benchflow 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
UK job 
reallocation 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the country-sector-year except in column 4. 
Additional controls are firm size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Effect of EPL on investment per worker 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
EPL 0.014 - - - - 
 (0.025) - - - - 
EPL × 
benchflow -0.207 -0.220 -0.264 -0.131 -0.541 
 (0.083)** (0.079)*** (0.079)*** (0.063)** (0.113)*** 
      
Observations 1735230 1735230 1735217 28778 1605400 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.83 0.12 
      
Sector FE YES - - - - 
Country FE YES - - - - 
Year FE YES - - - - 
Sector × Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Country × 
Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO 
      
Level of 
aggregation Firm Firm Firm Sector Firm 
Proxy for 
Benchflow 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
UK job 
reallocation 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the country-sector-year except in column 4. 
Additional controls are firm size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 4. Effect of EPL on value added per worker 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
EPL 0.095 - - - - 
 (0.022)*** - - - - 
EPL × 
Benchflow -0.269 -0.279 -0.269 -0.273 -1.488 
 (0.110)** (0.106)*** (0.106)** (0.102)*** (0.155)*** 
      
Observations 1574996 1574996 1575011 26716 1447989 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.79 0.18 
      
Sector FE YES - - - - 
Country FE YES - - - - 
Year FE YES - - - - 
Sector × Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Country × 
Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO 
      
Level of 
aggregation Firm Firm Firm Sector Firm 
Proxy for 
Benchflow 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
UK job 
reallocation 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the country-sector-year except in column 4. 
Additional controls are firm size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 5. Effect of EPL on job reallocation 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
EPL 0.015 - - - - 
 (0.003)*** - - - - 
EPL × 
Benchflow -0.052 -0.044 -0.033 -0.047 -0.002 
 (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.019) 
      
Observations 2177727 2177727 2177731 30665 2014307 
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.86 0.06 
      
Sector FE YES - - - - 
Country FE YES - - - - 
Year FE YES - - - - 
Sector × Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Country × 
Year NO YES YES YES YES 
Controls NO NO YES NO NO 
      
Level of 
aggregation Firm Firm Firm Sector Firm 
Proxy for 
Benchflow 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
Ciccone- 
Papaioannou 
(2007) 
UK job 
reallocation 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the country-sector-year except in column 4. 
Additional controls are firm size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 6. Joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfection on capital per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL - 0.021 - - - -
- (0.005)*** - - - -
EPL × BF -0.260 -0.446 -0.318 -0.327 -0.322 -1.320
(0.057)*** (0.116)*** (0.116)*** (0.116)*** (0.115)*** (0.226)***
Internal 
Resources -0.238 0.034 0.033 0.018 0.035 0.052
(0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.010)***
ROA 1.055 -0.090 -0.102 -0.001 -0.099 -0.101
(0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.006)***
EPL ×
Internal 
Resources
0.014 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)***
BF ×
Internal 
Resources
0.742 -0.176 -0.198 -0.113 -0.202 -0.209
(0.100)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.040)*** (0.061)*** (0.086)**
EPL × BF ×
Internal 
Resources
-0.201 0.065 0.077 0.056 0.079 0.090
(0.038)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.015)*** (0.023)*** (0.034)***
Observations 2040236 2040236 2040236 2039972 2040223 1885882
R-squared 0.28 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
Year FE YES YES - - - -
Country ×
Year YES NO YES YES YES YES
Sector ×
Year YES NO NO NO NO NO
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO YES NO
Proxy for 
Benchflow
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
UK job 
reallocation
Proxy for 
internal 
resources 
Cash flow Cash flow Cash flow Net Liquid Assets Cash flow Cash flow
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the firm -level. Additional controls are firm 
size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
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Table 7. Joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfection on investment per
worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL - -0.024 - - - -
- (0.006)*** - - - -
EPL × BF -0.199 0.304 0.157 0.101 0.145 0.186
(0.046)*** (0.164)* (0.161) (0.162) (0.161) (0.302)
Internal
Resources -0.078 -0.026 -0.025 0.007 -0.023 -0.018
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.014)
ROA 0.872 0.132 0.129 0.097 0.130 0.130
(0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
EPL ×
Internal
Resources
0.013 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.013
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)**
BF ×
Internal
Resources
0.042 0.086 0.068 -0.101 0.057 -0.047
(0.075) (0.084) (0.083) (0.046)** (0.084) (0.120)
EPL × BF ×
Internal
Resources
-0.045 -0.037 -0.029 0.032 -0.025 -0.027
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.018)* (0.032) (0.046)
Observations 1735230 1735230 1735230 1735049 1735210 1605400
R-squared 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Year FE YES YES - - - -
Country ×
Year YES NO YES YES YES YES
Sector ×
Year YES NO NO NO NO NO
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO YES NO
Proxy for 
Benchflow
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
UK job 
reallocation
Proxy for 
internal 
resources 
Cash flow Cash flow Cash flow Net Liquid Assets Cash flow Cash flow
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the firm -level. Additional controls are firm 
size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
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Table 8. Joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfection on value added per
worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL - 0.172 - - - -
- (0.003)*** - - - -
EPL × BF -0.241 -0.014 0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.460
(0.035)*** (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.120)***
Internal
Resources 0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.018 -0.010 0.007
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.010)
ROA 0.798 0.018 0.019 0.004 0.021 0.017
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.005)***
EPL ×
Internal
Resources
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.005
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)* (0.004)
BF ×
Internal
Resources
0.032 -0.044 -0.024 -0.016 -0.024 -0.168
(0.072) (0.061) (0.060) (0.029) (0.061) (0.087)*
EPL × BF ×
Internal 
Resources
-0.071 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.063
(0.026)*** (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.022) (0.033)*
Observations 1574996 1574996 1574996 1574750 1575000 1447989
R-squared 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Year FE YES YES - - - -
Country ×
Year YES NO YES YES YES YES
Sector ×
Year YES NO NO NO NO NO
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO YES NO
Proxy for 
Benchflow
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
UK job 
reallocation
Proxy for 
internal 
resources 
Cash flow Cash flow Cash flow Net Liquid Assets Cash flow Cash flow
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the firm -level. Additional controls are firm 
size, number of subsidiaries an d exports. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
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Table 9. Joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfection on job reallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL 0.006 - - -
(0.001)*** - - -
EPL × BF -0.048 0.022 0.025 0.016 0.025 0.024
(0.008)*** (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.065)
Internal 
Resources 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)* (0.001) (0.004)*
ROA -0.083 -0.047 -0.048 -0.041 -0.048 -0.047
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
EPL ×
Internal 
Resources
-0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.001)*
BF ×
Internal 
Resources
-0.023 -0.009 -0.008 -0.026 -0.008 0.050
(0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.012)** (0.023) (0.032)
EPL × BF ×
Internal 
Resources
0.007 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.004 -0.017
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)** (0.009) (0.013)
Observations 2177727 2177727 2177727 2177439 2177735 2014307
R-squared 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Year FE YES YES - - - -
Country ×
Year YES NO YES YES YES YES
Sector ×
Year YES NO NO NO NO NO
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO YES NO
Proxy for 
Benchflow
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
Ciccone-
Papaioannou 
(2007)
UK job 
reallocation
Proxy for 
internal 
resources 
Cash flow Cash flow Cash flow Net Liquid Assets Cash flow Cash flow
Robust standard errors in parentheses. clustered at the firm -level. Additional controls are firm 
size, number of subsidiaries and exports. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
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